Introduction
Do incumbents use social programs to get themselves re-elected? Much theoretical and empirical work on public expenditure patterns in democratic regimes argues that politicians manipulate the timing, composition, and geographic distribution of expenditures to maximize the likelihood of remaining in office. Increases in public expenditures are timed to coincide with upcoming elections; budgetary tradeoffs are made to satisfy important constituencies; and expenditures are directed towards areas of the country that are considered critical for an incumbent's re-election bid.
This paper discusses the relationship between elections and the expenditures made by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES) during President Alberto Fujimori's first term in office (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) .
FONCODES was created in 1991, during a severe recession which followed the adoption of stringent stabilization and structural adjustment measures by the Fujimori government. Its stated objectives were to generate employment, help alleviate poverty, and improve access to social services (World Bank 1998) . By 1993, the Peruvian economy had begun a remarkable recovery, and FONCODES was being hailed by government officials and foreign donors alike as an important component of a medium-term strategy to reduce poverty.
Scholars in Peru and abroad have generally been more guarded in their praise. Critics argue that social funds like FONCODES undermine line ministries and local governments. And questions about the "politicization" of FONCODES have bedeviled the program from its creation (Graham 1994 , Kay 1995 , Ballón and Beaumont 1996 . Yet there are no satisfactory studies of the impact of elections on FONCODES expenditures.
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This paper attempts to fill this gap using highly disaggregated data on expenditures, socioeconomic indicators, and electoral outcomes. I use econometric techniques to analyze the timing and geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures, and reach two main conclusions. First, FONCODES expenditures increased significantly prior to national elections. Second, FONCODES projects were directed to provinces in which the marginal political impact of expenditures was likely to be largest. The results are robust to a large number of specifications and controls. The Peruvian data thus support predictions made in the literature on "political business cycles" (Nordhaus 1975 , Rogoff 1990 ) as well as the literature on political influences on the allocation of discretionary funds (Wright 1974 , Cox and McCubbins 1986 , Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 , Dixit and Londregan 1996 , Case 1997 .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of Peruvian politics between 1990 and 1995, and FONCODES. Section 3 describes data requirements and sources for the paper. Section 4 estimates the effect of the electoral calendar on the timing of FONCODES 1 Moncada (1996) and Graham and Kane (1998) discuss the timing and distribution of FONCODES expenditures, respectively. As I discuss below, however, both papers have serious limitations.
expenditures. Section 5 estimates the effect of the 1990 presidential election on the distribution of expenditures. Section 6 concludes with some general thoughts on the use of social expenditures for electoral purposes.
The Fujimori years and FONCODES
The election of the dark horse candidate Alberto Fujimori to the Peruvian presidency in 1990
marked the beginning of a fundamental transformation of Peruvian politics. Fujimori, an independent with no political party to speak of, defeated the coalition of center-right parties headed by the well-known novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori's party did not, however, win a majority in either house of the Peruvian congress. Blaming Peru's "corrupt" institutions for his inability to introduce a coherent economic program or combat the terrorist insurgencies of Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru, Fujimori used the military to shut down congress and the judiciary in April 1992. Under international pressure to restore democracy, he drafted a new constitution which was approved by a small margin in a referendum held in October 1993, and won a landslide re-election to the presidency and a majority for his party in the new uni-cameral congress in April 1995.
The academic literature on Peru argues that traditional sources of authority and intermediation between citizens and the state have been weakened during President Fujimori's period in office (McClintock 1993 , Cameron 1994 , Mauceri 1995 , Conaghan 1996 , Seddon 1997 . The "historical" political parties have all but disappeared. 2 The legislative and judiciary branches of government have not acted as an effective check on the executive. 3 There have also been important changes in the relationship between various levels of government, and in the conduct of social policy. Decree 776, passed in December 1993, abolished most sources of tax revenue traditionally used by municipal governments.
Meanwhile, responsibility for the administration of numerous social and basic infrastructure programs has been transferred from local governments and line ministries in education, health, and transportation to the Ministry of the Presidency. By 1995, this Ministry controlled more than 20% of the central government 2 The four major parties which dominated civilian politics in Peru for decades have become irrelevant. These four parties--the conservative Popular Christian Party, the center-right Popular Action, the center-left APRA, and the leftwing United Left--jointly garnered 82.2% and 97% of the vote in the presidential elections of 1980 and 1985, respectively. In the 1995 presidential election they won a mere 6.3% of the vote (Tuesta, 1994; Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, 1995) . Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria, president Fujimori's party, has no outstanding leaders other than the president himself. Independent candidates with no affiliation to any party have dominated local politics. In the 1993 municipal elections, for example, independent candidates received almost two-thirds (64.7%) of the votes cast (Tuesta, 1995, p. 106) . 3 The legislative, where Fujimori's party has had an absolute majority since 1992, rubber-stamps the President's initiatives; on the only important occasion on which the Supreme Court contravened Fujimori's wishes, ruling that a draft law which would allow Fujimori to run for a second re-election in the year 2000 was unconstitutional, the three members who had voted with the majority opinion were dismissed from the bench.
first, by using a "poverty map" to assign resources to small geographic areas, and then conducting an informal on-site assessment of the "poverty" of the community requesting a project. 
The data set
In 1997, Peru was divided into 13 administrative regions, 24 departments, 194 provinces, and 1812 districts (Webb and Fernández Baca 1997, p. 112) . Regions and departments are administrative arms of the central government, which appoints a governor for every region. Provincial and district-level mayors are chosen at municipal elections every three years. Data on FONCODES expenditures, socio-economic characteristics, and voting patterns is available at different levels of geographic aggregation.
FONCODES itself keeps monthly records on the number of projects and aggregate amounts spent in each district. Three points are worth noting about these data. First, because expenditures are recorded in the month in which a project is approved, there is a lag of about two weeks before disbursement of the first installment of funds, and of several months before the second (and final) disbursement. Second, only expenditures on projects are included, and not administrative costs or expenses for general overhead.
Third, district-level information on the distribution of expenditures is only available for the communitybased projects. There is no information on the allocation formulas or the actual distribution of the special projects.
The Peruvian National Statistical Institute (INEI) has estimated population size, the proportion rural, and a host of socio-economic indicators at the district level. Most of these indicators are based on a population and housing census conducted in 1993. The one important exception is the rate of chronic malnutrition, which is based on a census of height and weight amongst schoolchildren also conducted in
1993.
The Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, the body which supervises elections in Peru, keeps records on electoral outcomes for elections held since 1990. Some of these data have also been compiled and published (Tuesta 1994, Jurado Nacional de Elecciones). Results are generally available for all provinces in the country, and for all districts in Metropolitan Lima.
The level of aggregation used for the analysis in this paper was dictated by theoretical considerations and the availability of data. Section 4 uses national aggregates of FONCODES expenditures to analyze the relationship between the timing of expenditures and the electoral calendar.
Sources of funding and the administration of the community-based and special projects are different, so the analysis is broken down by project type. FONCODES has assigned resources to individual provinces since 1993, and to individual districts since 1996. Section 5 uses a province-level data set to analyze the influence of electoral outcomes on the geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures for community-based projects. To avoid having one data point account for 5.78 million inhabitants--more than a quarter of the population of the entire country--the province of Metropolitan Lima has been further divided into its districts. The term "province" is used throughout the paper to refer to districts in Metropolitan Lima and provinces elsewhere.
The timing of FONCODES expenditures
This section discusses the possible effect of the electoral calendar on the timing of FONCODES expenditures. I briefly review the literature, discuss econometric specifications, and present results.
There is a long-standing debate about the extent to which politicians can successfully manipulate the economy to coincide with elections. The traditional political business cycle literature predicts increases in expenditures before an election (Nordhaus, Tufte 1978) . Although the assumptions underlying these models were brought into question with the advent of rational expectations theory, Rogoff shows that political business cycles could be expected to occur even if voters are fully rational but there are information asymmetries between voters and incumbents.
The empirical evidence from Less Developed Countries (LDCs) tends to support the predictions made in the political business cycle literature. In a study covering seventeen Latin American countries over 35 years, Ames (1987) shows significant increases in total public sector expenditures in electoral years. More recently, Schuknecht (1996) finds further evidence for political business cycles in a study which covers 35 countries in the 1970 to 1992 period. Rodrik (1991 , cited in Waterbury 1993 and Buffie and Sangines Krause (1989, pp. 144-45 ) also observe pre-electoral expansions in Turkey and Mexico, respectively. One partial exception to this body of evidence is Remmer (1993) , who uses recent data from six Latin American countries to argue that economic conditions generally deteriorated in the period leading up to an election and improved thereafter. This suggests that politicians may try, but are often unable to manipulate macro-economic variables successfully, an argument which has also been made for Western Europe (Lewis-Beck 1988). A different issue, which has not been resolved in the empirical literature, is whether voters in LDCs actually reward politicians for their pre-electoral spending sprees (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Stokes 1996a 
Estimates of election effects
If there is a political expenditure cycle, FONCODES expenditures at a particular point should be a function of the electoral calendar:
(1)
where Exp t stands for FONCODES expenditures in time t, Elec t is the presence (or absence) of an election at the end of time period t, and z t is a vector of exogenous variables which affect expenditures.
The timing of elections is taken to be determined outside the model. Insofar as it is easier to manipulate the timing of FONCODES expenditures than the timing of elections, this is a reasonable assumption. The results in Table 1 confirm the general picture in Figure 1 . The electoral parameter in columns (i), (iii) and (v) is positive and significant at the 5% level or better in all three specifications. This suggests that expenditures on both community-based projects and special projects were significantly higher than expected in the three months leading up to elections. When the three elections enter into the regression separately, the influence of elections on the timing of expenditures is most apparent for the special projects, especially for the October 1993 referendum and the April 1995 presidential election.
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The empirical analysis above suggests that Fujimori boosted FONCODES expenditures when it mattered most. But there are obviously other factors at work. Consider, for example, the expenditure spike in September 1994 (month=35), the second-largest in the data set. In August 1994, Manuel Vara
Ochoa replaced Manuel Estela as the executive director of FONCODES. Estela was a technocrat who was highly regarded at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Prior to being appointed executive director of FONCODES, he had been the head of SUNAT, the government agency charged with the collection of taxes in Peru. Estela brought to FONCODES his advisors from SUNAT, and a working method which emphasized a rigorous screening of project proposals. This was not, however, to Fujimori's liking, and the president quickly became dissatisfied with Estela's unwillingness to meet "disbursement targets". 8 Estela's replacement, Manuel Vara Ochoa, was a friend of President
Fujimori's from their days together as professors at the Agrarian University in Lima, and was understood to be more sensitive to the political importance of a speedy approval process. The massive spike in expenditures in September 1994 may be a result of the wholesale approval of projects which had not been funded during the Estela period.
In conclusion, there is some evidence of a political expenditure cycle in FONCODES projects, but the electoral calendar is by no means the only determinant of changes in FONCODES expenditures between 1991 and 1995. 7 The changing political context in Peru may explain differences in the effect of elections on FONCODES expenditures. The Fujimori government had much at stake in the October 1993 referendum and the April 1995 presidential election. The referendum on the new constitution was widely seen as a referendum on three years of Fujimori government (Roberts and Arce 1998, p. 229) . Moreover, the new constitution included a clause which would allow Fujimori to run for re-election--something which he could not to do under the 1980 constitution. The April 1995 election, meanwhile, would assure Fujimori five more years as president. By contrast, the November 1992 election to the constituent assembly took place at a time when the government was virtually unchallenged: the opposition was in disarray after Fujimori's "self-coup" of April 1992, and Fujimori's popularity was very high. Indeed, three of the four "historical" parties--Popular Action, APRA, and the United Left--did not even participate in the 1992 election, alleging that this would "legitimize" Fujimori's coup. The Popular Christian Party participated, but won only 9.8% of the vote. Fujimori's Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría party won 49.2% of the vote, and 44 of the 80 seats in the constituent assembly. The remaining 41% of the vote went to smaller parties, many of which had been formed shortly before the election. 8 Author's conversations with staff at FONCODES and at the Ministry of the Presidency. One knowledgeable staff member described the relationship between Estela and Fujimori as "strained" and related a telephone conversation in which Fujimori gave Estela a serious warning ("un toque de atencion de palacio").
The geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures
This section discusses the influence of elections on the geographic distribution of FONCODES expenditures on community-based projects. Specifically, it tests a model in which past electoral outcomes are used to predict future expenditures. First, I briefly review the literature on the topic, and describe some features peculiar to the Peruvian setting. I next discuss the econometric specification, and present results.
A basic theory of the determinants of voting behavior might consider the affinity of voters for different candidates (an "ideological" component) and the changes in welfare that voters can expect to see after an election (an "economic" component) (Lindbeck and Weibull, Markus 1988 , Peltzman 1990 , Dixit and Londregan, Landon and Ryan 1997 . If voters face a choice between an incumbent and his challenger(s), they might use the performance of the incumbent while in office as a reasonable guide to the policies they could expect to see enacted if the incumbent were re-elected. 9 The probability that voter i will vote for the incumbent at time t, P it , might then be described in the following terms:
where v i is a time-invariant, non-economic parameter which affects the vote. This parameter could include voter i's perception of the incumbent's character, or the ideological affinity between voter i and the incumbent. I assume that the parameter v i ranges from -∞ to ∞, representing strong dislike and like for the incumbent, respectively; Y it -Y it-1 is a parameter that reflects aggregate changes in the economy that can plausibly be attributed to the incumbent; and W it -W it-1 is a parameter that measures the change in net transfers (transfers-taxes) for voter i during the incumbent's previous period in office. 10 By assumption, the function g is bounded between 0 and 1 over its support. If there is no abstention, the expected number of votes for the incumbent at time t is then given by the sum of all the P it 's.
How should a rational incumbent distribute taxes and transfers across the electorate to maximize the expected number of votes in the next election? The answer to this question clearly depends on whether a unit change in W it -W it-1 has the same effect on P it across all i. To simplify the notation, I define R i to be the change in the probability P it that results from a unit change in net transfers W it -W it-1 . R i can 9 Arguably, voters base their decisions on the promises made by an incumbent and his challenger(s) before an election, and this is the starting point for much theoretical work on the subject (Cox and McCubbins, Lindbeck and Weibull, Dixit and Londregan) . Alas, promises can be just that, and voters may not take them to be a reliable indication of intended behavior in office. The issue of the (lack of) credibility of promises is particularly relevant in Peru: Fujimori was elected in 1990 on a platform which opposed economic "shock therapy", yet he implemented one of the most radical orthodox programs to stabilize and re-structure the economy within weeks of taking office (Stokes, Roberts and Arce) . For this reason, I take Fujimori's record in office to be a more credible indication of his intended policies than any campaign promises. 10 "Sociotropic" theories of voting generally emphasize aggregate economic trends, whereas "pocketbook" theories of voting emphasize changes in individual welfare (see, for example, Markus).
therefore be thought of as index of the "political productivity" of net transfers to different voters. R i is itself a function of the initial, pre-transfer income of voters and the parameter v i :
There are numerous competing theories about the relationship between v i and R i . Cox and McCubbins argue that R i is largest when transfers are made to voters with a value of v i which is large and positive. There are two key insights here. First, incumbents may be risk-averse. Transfers by incumbents to "core supporters" whose needs and preferences they understand better are likely to be a safer investment than transfers to other (unknown) voters. Second, there are administrative costs and inefficiencies which limit the fraction of transfers which actually materializes as a benefit to voters. This fraction may be higher when incumbents make transfers to core supporters.
Lindbeck and Weibull argue that R i is largest when transfers are made to "swing" or "marginal"
voters with a value of v i close to zero. The intuition behind this result is that transfers to voters who strongly favor (oppose) the incumbent are unlikely to make a difference as these voters will probably vote for (against) the incumbent regardless of the transfer. Lindbeck and Weibull extend their model to consider cases in which politicians seek to maximize the probability of being re-elected rather than the expected number of votes. Under these circumstances, if candidates are not equally popular, Lindbeck and Weibull show that supporters of the more popular candidate are more likely to be "pivotal" voters who could decide the outcome of the election. For any two values of v i which are identical in magnitude but opposite in sign (αv i , -αv i ), incumbents should therefore favor supporters of the candidate who is more popular.
Dixit and Londregan suggest that the choice between a strategy which favors swing voters and one which favors core supporters depends on whether incumbents can collect taxes and distribute benefits more effectively among their supporters. In general, rational incumbents should favor swing voters when there are no such differences, but core supporters when there are.
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Finally, one might consider dynamic models in which politicians take into account changes, rather than (or in addition to) levels of electoral support. Take the example of an incumbent who has already survived (at least) one re-election. Can (s)he derive information by comparing the results from the most recent election with those from prior elections? One strategy this incumbent might try to follow would be 11 Dixit and Londregan also propose two additional parameters which should affect the decision to favor some groups over others. First, for any given value of v i , some groups are more willing than others to compromise on their ideological preferences in exchange for material rewards. Those groups which are less attached to their ideology should expect to receive higher transfers. Second, for two groups with a value of v i equal to zero, Dixit and Londregan argue that rational incumbents will favor that group with the lower variability. This is because more members of that group switch their votes for any given transfer. In practice, these parameters cannot easily be identified with data on electoral outcomes and expenditures, and I do not consider them further.
to "buy back" traditional supporters who have recently backed opposition candidates-either because it is cheaper or less risky to bring these voters back into the fold than to attract new supporters, or because there are long-term benefits to having a stable base of support which are not captured by the formulation in (2) and (3) above.
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There is also controversy about the relationship between income and the political productivity of transfers. If there is diminishing marginal utility of income, voters with low initial levels of income should benefit more from a given transfer than their wealthier counterparts. The political productivity of transfers to the poor should therefore be higher (Lindbeck and Weibull, Dixit and Londregan) . However, if the poor are less likely to vote than the non-poor, the negative correlation between R i and y i may be dampened, or become positive (Cox and McCubbins, also Fleck 1994) . 13 Note, finally, that a negative correlation between y i and transfers could also be explained by an altruistic parameter in the incumbent's utility function, a possibility which is discounted in all of these models.
The discussion above implies that incumbents can observe the individual v i directly. This is obviously unrealistic, but incumbents may be able to estimate voter preferences by looking at geographic patterns in prior electoral outcomes. For example, incumbents could assume that all voters in a province are identical or, more plausibly, that the distribution of preferences differs systematically across provinces (Dixit and Londregan) . It can be shown that the probability that a randomly selected voter in province d
will have voted for a party j is equivalent to the share of the vote for party j in province d (Deacon and Shapiro 1975) . Voters in provinces in which 50% of the population voted for the incumbent in the last election are therefore most likely to be marginal: the probability that they supported the incumbent is exactly the same as the probability that they supported other candidates. The same logic obviously applies to core supporters, who are most likely to be found in districts which voted heavily for the incumbent. Finally, comparing the results from two or more past elections enables incumbents to identify districts in which voters are most likely to have switched support from the incumbent to the opposition.
Two-tier elections, taxes and transfers in Peru
To test the predictive power of the formal models discussed above, we must make some additional assumptions about two features of elections and expenditures peculiar to the Peruvian setting: the twotiered structure of presidential elections, and the geographic incidence of the taxes, if any, which must be raised to finance expenditures.
Presidential elections in Peru are often decided in two stages: if no candidate receives a simple majority in the first round of the election, a run-off election is held between the two candidates with the largest number of votes. In the 1990 election, Vargas Llosa was ahead by a small margin after the first round of voting on April 8 (32.6% to Fujimori's 29.1%), but lost by a large margin in the second round held on June 10 (37.6% to Fujimori's 62.4%). Candidate Fujimori was a virtual unknown in many areas of the country until shortly before the first round of the election (Stokes 1996b , Carrión 1996 , Schmidt 1996 , but he had become a household name two months later. Because voters in Peru were arguably constrained by lack of information in the first round of the election, I use the results of the run-off election for all estimations below.
Transfer programs like FONCODES are generally paid for out of tax revenues. Since taxes have a geographic incidence pattern which could also affect electoral outcomes, one might be concerned with the distribution of "net transfers", the per capita difference between transfers and taxes needed to finance a program.
FONCODES was initially funded with the proceeds of privatizations done early on in Fujimori's first term, rather than from tax revenues. When these resources became scarce, the Peruvian government appealed to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for funding, and two loans for US $ 100 million and US $ 94 million, respectively, were made available to FONCODES in early 1994.
14 These loans included provisions for a five-year grace period and full amortization over seventeen years--presumably, well after President Fujimori would have left office. Theory suggests that fully rational voters should take into account the net present value of the expected taxes that would have to be raised in the future to repay the loans. In practice, however, short time horizons, lack of information, and the 14 Determining the exact moment at which foreign funding became available is not straightforward. The World Bank loan, for example, was approved in December 1993, became effective in March 1994, and disbursement against it began in May 1994. But the loan included a proviso that up to US $ 10 million could be used to fund eligible community-based projects approved since August 1, 1993. There is also controversy about the extent to which multilateral organizations like the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund attempted to convince Fujimori of the importance of targeted pro-poor programs, or went along with Fujimori's own initiatives only reluctantly. Although the IMF and the Banks had some initial concerns about FONCODES (Kay, Graham 1994) , the fact that FONCODES was very similar to other programmes funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank throughout Latin America meant that loans for FONCODES could be justified because of their likely impact on the poor. possibility, real or imagined, of debt re-negotiation or default could limit the extent to which voters in Peru consider these future costs. This paper only considers FONCODES transfers. Non-parametric regression analysis can be thought of as a moving average. The expectation of Y (in this case, the log of per capita FONCODES expenditures) is estimated conditional on X (the pro-government vote in the 1990 election or the 1993 referendum) without imposing any assumptions about functional form. It is therefore a much more flexible and accurate way to represent bivariate associations than, say, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). For an excellent introduction to non-parametric regressions see , as well as Silverman (1986) and Hardle (1991) . To avoid dropping provinces which received zero transfers, I add 1 to per capita expenditures in every province before taking logs (see Maddala 1983, p. 181 , for a similar ad hoc correction).
1993-March 1995 period. In both instances, there appears to be some curvature in the relationship between the vote and expenditures. Multivariate regression analysis allows for a parsing out of the "political" and "technical" influences on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures. Second, previous studies generally test for a linear effect of elections on the distribution of expenditures (Graham and Kane) . This approach does not allow for non-linearities which are at the heart of the marginal voter models, or the dynamic changes in the buyback model. 16 Third, earlier work uses department-level (rather than province-or district-level)
information on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures and the vote in various elections. This seriously diminishes the sample size and makes it difficult to run meaningful regressions. Even more important, however, in Peru there are often very large differences in the vote within departments. In the department of Amazonas, for example, only 23.2% of the population of the province of Condorcanqui, but 60.0% of the population of neighboring Bongara voted for the government in 1993. More formally, the total variance in the distribution of the pro-government vote can be decomposed into inter-department and intra-department components (for example, Cowell 1995) . Such a decomposition shows that less than half of the total variation in the vote in the 1990 election and the 1993 referendum (43.0% and 46.8%, respectively) is accounted for by differences across departments. Since all of this information was published, it is hard to believe that the government would deliberately have chosen not to make use of it.
Finally, the results presented by Graham and Kane and others do not acknowledge that estimates of the influence of elections on FONCODES expenditures after 1993 may be contaminated by simultaneity bias.
I now turn to this question.
Econometric specification
Formally estimating the (possible) impact of elections on expenditures presents a number of econometric complications. Simultaneity bias is perhaps the most obvious. Consider the following equation:
where Exp pt is per capita expenditures in province p at time t, Elec pt-1 is the outcome of an election in province p in the previous time period t-1, z1 pt is a vector of other variables which affect the distribution of expenditures, and ε pt is the error term. If the error term is auto-correlated over time, it could be rewritten as:
where ρ is the auto-correlation coefficient. Equation (4) where z2 pt is a vector of other variables which affect election outcomes, and w pt is the error term. If both (6) and (7) hold, it can easily be shown that estimating the parameter β by OLS will produce results which are biased and inconsistent (Deaton 1997, pp. 97-98) . The intuition is that electoral outcomes are themselves "contaminated" by expenditures in the previous time period(s).
Bias is induced when both conditions-serial correlation in the error term, and an effect of expenditures on elections-are met. In practice, there is often good reason to suspect that the error term ε pt is positively auto-correlated over time. Demand-driven programs like FONCODES probably involve a cumulative acquisition of skills and knowledge by potential beneficiaries: it takes time to understand what kinds of projects are eligible for funding, practice to prepare a good proposal, and time to develop contacts with the social fund staff who are ultimately responsible for review of the application. If there is such a learning curve, communities which prepare a successful proposal once should find it easier to do so again, while others which are turned down might decide that applying for funding is not worth the effort after all. In terms of (6) above, positive and negative shocks to the error term in one period are likely to be carried forward into the next period. Meanwhile, the presumption that social expenditures may affect electoral outcomes seems reasonable. Since there may well be serial correlation and an effect of expenditures on elections, studies which disregard the possibility of simultaneity must be treated with caution (see, for example, Bruhn, Graham and Kane).
The standard solution to this simultaneity problem is instrumental variables. But the search for appropriate instruments is not simple: variables which affect elections tend to affect expenditures as well.
The Peruvian case offers a partial solution to this problem, however, because we may legitimately be able to treat the 1990 election as exogenous to the model. FONCODES did not fund any projects until more than a year after the 1990 election. The election cannot therefore have been affected by FONCODES expenditures, equation (7) does not apply, and simultaneity should not be a source of bias in the parameters estimated in (4) There is nothing distinctive about the provinces for which electoral data is missing--they are not, for example, particularly poor or rich, or concentrated in one part of the country. As a safeguard, however, I run additional regressions in which the missing values are replaced with the relevant departmental averages. 18 The results (not reported) are very similar to those which do not include these provinces, suggesting that this is not a source of bias.
17 Unless, of course, the new program was promised before an election, the promise was regarded as credible, and it influenced the outcome of the election (Avinash Dixit, personal communication with the author, April 1998). Fujimori committed himself to not implementing the kind of "shock" adjustment program advocated by his opponent Mario Vargas Llosa, a commitment he quickly broke after the election. His platform also made references to continued subsidies for basic consumer goods, and to the promotion of small domestic industries (I thank an anonymous referee for this information). The results for the 1991-1993 period will only be contaminated by endogeneity bias, however, if Fujimori's campaign promises were credible and specific enough to enable voters in different provinces to predict differences in the transfers they could expect to receive from a program "like" FONCODES (since FONCODES itself was never mentioned in the campaign). 18 For example, there are no electoral results for the seven provinces in the department of Apurimac, but we know that 81.54% of the population of the department voted for Fujimori. These regressions would therefore assume that the pro-Fujimori vote in each of the seven provinces was 81.54%.
FONCODES financed no community-based projects in 12 provinces between December 1991 and
October 1993, and in another 12 provinces between November 1993 and March 1995 (six of the provinces overlap). Censoring of this sort can make OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. Tobit regressions are routinely used as a solution to this problem, but Tobit estimates will also be biased and inconsistent if, as is often the case, the distribution of the error term is heteroskedastic. An alternative estimator, Powell's censored Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator, is unbiased and consistent but requires large amounts of data (see Deaton, , for an excellent introduction to these issues). In practice, the bias induced by censoring in the regressions in this paper is likely to be small because censoring affects less than 6% of the sample. I therefore present OLS estimates, and make a note when the Tobit or Powell estimators produce noticeably different results. 
Estimates of political effects: the 1991-93 period

21
If variables are omitted from the model, and these variables are correlated with the measures of marginality, core support, or the FONCODES index, the coefficients on these parameters will be biased and inconsistent in the usual way. I address this problem by including a large number of controls. The OLS regression for column (ii) includes parameters for the (log of the) population of a province, and the 19 Alternatively, "core supporters" could have been approximated by the vote for Fujimori in the first round of the election, and "swing voters" by the additional vote for Fujimori in the second round of the election (Chang TaiHsieh, personal communication with the author, September 1998). One disadvantage of this procedure in the Peruvian context is that it would further have limited the sample size, as the results of the first round of the 1990 presidential election are available only for 180 of the 224 provinces which existed at the time. 20 FONCODES has made adjustments to the index it uses every year--taking out some individual indicators, including new ones, and changing the weights given to each one. The indices used before 1996 were disaggregated at the province level only. Since I disaggregated the province of Metropolitan Lima into its individual districts, only the 1996 index could be used for the analysis. Because most of the individual indicators tend to be highly correlated with one another, however, the choice of index is unlikely to have an important effect on the results. The results in Tables 3 and 5 are robust to alternative measures of "consumption", such as the province-level estimates of imputed income and imputed proportion below the poverty line developed by INEI (Schady 1999) . 21 Moreover, given the dramatic changes in the Peruvian political landscape in the early 1990's and the fact that Fujimori was not the candidate of one of the established parties, he could not reasonably hope to extract information from presidential elections held before 1990.
proportion rural. The large t-statistic on the FONCODES index in columns (i) and (ii) suggests that it is important that the relationship between expenditures and the index be specified correctly. To account for possible non-linearities in this relationship, I include a Fourier series expansion of the FONCODES index in column (iii). 22 In addition, this regression includes numerous socio-economic controls listed at the foot of the table, and a dummy variable for border provinces. This border dummy is included as a control because FONCODES may have spent differently in areas near the volatile Ecuadorian border. Finally, the specification in column (iii) includes 25 department-level dummies. FONCODES' regional offices generally correspond to departments, and these dummies are meant to capture differences in institutional capacity across offices, as well as any other possible department-level differences. *indicates significance at the 10% level; **indicates significance at the 5% level; ***indicates significance at the 1% level. Note: Absolute t-statistics are reported in brackets, and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. An F-test on both political variables is also reported. A constant was calculated but not reported. Additional controls: A Fourier series expansion of the FONCODES index, province-level averages for the age of the household head, the average number of years of schooling of household members, the occupation of all adults in the household, separate variables for the proportion of households who own a car, a refrigerator, color TV, and black and white TV, the proportion of the population that is indigenous (defined as those whose mother tongue is a language other than Spanish), the infant mortality rate, a dummy variable for border provinces, and twenty-five departmental dummies.
The results in Table 3 show that marginal voters, core supporters, and the poor all received a disproportionate share of FONCODES expenditures. The coefficient on the measure of non-marginality is always negative, and is significant at the 5% level when all of the controls are added; the coefficient on the measure of core support is positive and significant at the 5% level in every specification. 23 Note that this is a very strong result indeed: the political variables are significant even after dozens of controls, including sophisticated non-linear measures of the poverty of a province, are incorporated into the model.
Finally, the coefficient on the FONCODES index is positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that FONCODES spent significantly more on the poor. The sign on the coefficients when the parameters are estimated with Tobit or Powell's censored LAD is the same, and the magnitude of the effects of the political variables and the FONCODES index tends to be larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
The only important difference is that the censored LAD estimates produce larger standard errors, so that the political coefficients are no longer significant when all of the controls are included.
How large are these estimated effects? Table 4 reports the predicted effect of one-standard deviation changes in core support, marginality, and the (log of the) FONCODES index on per capita FONCODES expenditures. Column (ii), which corresponds to column (ii) in Table 3 , shows that, ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the vote for Fujimori resulted in a 55% increase in per capita expenditures, while a one standard deviation increase in marginality resulted in a 13% increase in per capita expenditures. Increases in poverty also have a large impact on expenditures: a one standard deviation increase in the (log of the) FONCODES index resulted in a 34% increase in per capita expenditures. Table 4 suggests that the effect of the two political variables is large indeed, especially as the number of controls increases. But interpretation of the magnitude of the political effects is not 23 If politicians maximize the probability of being re-elected, rather than the expected number of votes, the positive coefficient on the pro-Fujimori vote could also be a measure of the "partisan reward" for the supporters of the stronger party predicted in the modified Lindbeck-Weibull model (Lindbeck and Weibull, Case) . More generally, there is no obvious way to disentangle the effect of "core support" from that of "partisan reward" when the incumbent is also the stronger of the two parties (Mark Thomas, personal communication with the author, March 1998).
straightforward because marginality and core support work against each other at levels of support for Fujimori above 50%: for instance, a province in which 75% of the population voted for Fujimori could expect to receive large or small per capita transfers, depending on whether the effect of core-support or marginality is more important. To clarify this matter, Figure 4 graphs predicted expenditures at various levels of support for Fujimori for each of the specifications in Table 3 . Other variables in the regressions are kept constant at their means. 24 Figure 4 shows that the estimated effect of core support is much larger than that of marginality when only the two political variables and the FONCODES index are included in the regression (specification (i)), but the effect of marginality increases noticeably with the number of controls (specification (iii)). 
Estimates of political effects: the 1993-95 period
The Peruvian political landscape changed dramatically between 1990 and 1993. In the 1993 referendum, Fujimori generally did well in wealthier urban areas, especially Lima, but he lost the support of large segments of lower-class and rural voters who had brought him into office in 1990 (Stokes 1996b, 24 Mechanically, this can be done by multiplying the coefficient on non-political parameters in the regression by the mean value for the parameter in question, and then adding them to the constant in the regression. The coefficients on the measures of core support and non-marginality are then used to predict expenditures at every level of the vote between 0 and 100%. The results in Tables 5 should be Table 5 suggest that changes in the vote between 1993 and 1990, rather than simply the level of government support in the 1993 referendum, influenced the distribution of FONCODES expenditures after 1993. The coefficients on the measures of marginal vote and core support are jointly insignificant at the 5% level in all of the specifications. By contrast, the coefficient on the change in the pro-Fujimori vote is significant at the 1% level or better in two of the three specifications in Table 5 . Roberts and Arce argue that Fujimori attempted to "recapture the loyalty of the popular sectors" by picking up the pace of poverty-alleviation programmes after 1993. The results in Table 5 suggest that social expenditures channeled through FONCODES were used for such a buy-back strategy in a very focussed way: FONCODES projects were specifically directed at provinces which had supported Fujimori in 1990, but had abandoned him in 1993.
Tables 5 shows that poverty continued to be an important determinant of per capita expenditures:
the coefficient on the (log of the) FONCODES index is positive, large, and highly significant in all specifications. Rurality is also associated with significantly higher per capita expenditures (columns (ii), (v)). 26 This finding does not conform with an extensive literature in the political economy of development which argues that vocal and organized urban constituencies in LDCs siphon off the bulk of public funds (Bates 1981 , Nelson 1992 , Graham 1997 . FONCODES expenditures in the November 1993-March 1995 period favored rural areas, perhaps because there were other social programs in Peru at the time which were directed at urban populations.
27
What, finally, can we say about the magnitude of these effects? Table 6 summarizes the effect of one-standard deviation changes in the log of the FONCODES index and the measure of the change in proFujimori support on the distribution of per capita FONCODES expenditures. The results suggest that the political influence on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures continued to be large: a one standard deviation decrease in the pro-Fujimori vote resulted in anything between a 16% and a 34% increase in per capita expenditures. Meanwhile, the effect of poverty on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures appears to have increased after the referendum. This result is consistent with those reported elsewhere 26 Interpretation of the coefficients on the proportion rural and population size in columns (iii), (vi) and (ix) is not straightforward because of the high degree of collinearity between these variables and all of the additional controls. The same caveat obviously applies to column (iii) in Table 3 
Conclusion
This There is no simple answer to this question because it appears that decisions about FONCODES funding were made on the basis of both political and technical criteria. Ironically, it is precisely those features which enabled FONCODES to reach the poor, such as a high degree of flexibility in the allocation, timing, and composition of expenditures, which made it particularly vulnerable to political interference.
This tension between effective redistribution and "pork barrel" policies need be no coincidence: Nelson argues that pro-poor programs are much more likely to be implemented when the executive keeps "control over patronage".
The government of President Alberto Fujimori has privatized state-owned enterprises, liberalized markets, and slashed subsidies and tariffs in Peru. Fujimori has thus eliminated many of the tools which incumbents have traditionally used to enlist the support of important constituencies before an election (Herbst 1990 , Grindle 1996 . Of course, low inflation and high rates of economic growth also bring important returns at the polls-returns that may far exceed those from the more interventionist policies of yore (Nelson, Przeworski 1993 , Stokes 1996a ). This paper shows, however, that old populist habits die hard.
